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INTRODUCTION

Immigration law is often an emotional topic, too often quickly
leading to acrimony notwithstanding that the sentiment behind a
generous immigration policy represents one of the highest moral
ideals that the citizens and government of this country can embody.
Indeed, the American munificence towards foreigners and refugees
affected me greatly. 1 Following World War II, my father and his

Then-Senator Mike DeWine described my family’s history on the
floor of the Senate as follows:
After six million Jews were murdered in World War II, surviving
Jews from across Europe and Asia made the trek to the holy land.
They sought their homeland and peace. They obtained the former,
but not the latter. One such man seeking a homeland and peace
was Mark Steinbuch, the late father of one of my Judiciary
staffers, Robert Steinbuch. Born in Poland, Mark and his family
lived under Nazi occupation, relocated to Siberia shortly after the
start of World War II, and then traveled for two weeks by cattle
car to live in Soviet Kazakhstan. [His] extended family faced
some horrific challenges. Many were killed by the Nazis. His
cousins—the Hershenfis family—were forced into labor in the
Pionki ghetto in Poland. In 1941, the family was shipped off to
Auschwitz. Hanna and her brother Harry were separated from
each other and from their parents Fay and Harvey. Fay and
Harvey never made it out of the death camp. Hanna, tattooed with
the number A14699, was shipped to an intermediate camp and
then Bergen-Belsen. Harry—B416 to the Nazis—worked hard
labor in Auschwitz for four years and in 1944 was sent to another
camp called Mauthausen. On May 3, 1945, the Nazis fled the
camp. That night the skies opened and sent down a rainfall as if
the world was being cleansed from the horrors that it had seen.
The next morning, the Americans arrived and the 11th Armored
Division liberated the camp. Three days later, Harry turned 26.
After five weeks in an American hospital, Harry spent the next
three years in a displaced persons camp in Austria. In 1949,
Harry's wishes were answered, and he set off for America. Four
years later, when Hanna also came to the United States, the
siblings were reunited for the first time since they were shipped
1
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family fled to the Americans in Germany, who were there rebuilding
Germany and managing displaced persons. My family immigrated
to Israel while it was a mandate of Great Britain, and eventually
moved to the United States and became citizens; as such, I truly
appreciate, understand and empathize when persecuted people flee
for America. 2 While my father was never in a concentration camp,
other family members tragically were. 3
The enduring question that the controversial debate over
immigration has still failed to answer is: what are and what should
be the limits to our ideals and how should we enforce those limits,
whatever they may be? 4 Evaluating all of the complexities of

off to Auschwitz 13 years prior. . . . Upon the defeat of the Nazis,
[my father’s] immediate family went to Germany, because, as
[he] described it, “that is where the Americans were, and if you
wanted to live, you went to the Americans.” From there, Mark
joined the Zionist Youth Movement and set off for Israel. That,
however, was no easy task. Traveling across Europe, often on foot
to a southern port, he, his brother, and many others like them
boarded an overloaded freighter renamed the Theodore Hertzl
after the founder of Zionist Movement. Upon the ship's arrival in
Israel, the British quickly arrested its passengers and sent them to
a holding camp in Cyprus. Months later, Mark and the others
were allowed to enter Israel. Upon the joyous declaration of
independence, seven Arab nations invaded Israel and Mark
quickly joined the Army. Under-aged and flatfooted, he fought
for the independence of this nascent democracy. Mark's story is
by no means unique. It not only represented the goals and desires
of the Jews of post-war Europe, but the dreams of a nation of
people dispersed from their homeland for millennia.
Statement of Senator Mike DeWine (R. OH) on Israeli Independence
Day, May 12, 2015, https://votesmart.org/public-statement/95133/floorstatement-israeli-independence#.XTHAEzdOkwD (last visited Dec. 4,
2021).
2 Id.
3 See Robert Steinbuch, 3 Common Arguments for Overlooking Illegal
Immigration That Don’t Hold Water, THE FEDERALIST (July 24, 2019),
https://thefederalist.com/2019/07/24/3-common-arguments-overlookingillegal-immigration-dont-hold-water/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
4 Id.
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immigration law in the United States, even if possible, would be a
daunting task indeed—one well beyond the capacity of any article.
Instead, I seek to address two issues that have permeated the
more-recent debate on immigration, with the hope of providing
some necessary background and analysis of these questions. The
goal is not to solve the immigration crisis, but rather to help cabin
the discussion in an historical and analytical framework. As such, I
intend to focus on two issues:
(1) understanding how and why we wound up where we
are regarding family separation and the treatment of
unaccompanied minors, and
(2) fairly measuring and analyzing the impact of certain
costs of immigration, both monetary and social.
I seek to analyze some of the legal challenges, as well as the
policy arguments, on both sides of these topics with the hope that
the information will aid in engaging with these matters in an
informed and clear-headed fashion.

II. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION
There are three main ways a person can become an
undocumented immigrant. 5 One is by entering the country legally
with a legitimate visa but staying past that visa’s expiration. 6
Between 30%–50% of undocumented immigrants each year enter
the country this way. 7 Another, and the least common of the three

5 See 3 of the Most Common Ways People Immigrate Illegally, POZO
GOLDSTEIN, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW (May 07, 2017),
https://www.pozogoldsteinny.com/illegal-immigration/; see also Modes of
Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(May 22, 2006) https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2006/05/22/modesof-entry-for-the-unauthorized-migrant-population/ (last visited Dec. 4,
2021).
6 Id.
7 Id.; see also Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant
Population, supra note 5 (putting the estimate at forty to fifty percent in
2006).

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

6

VOL. 17.2

methods of undocumented immigration, is for an immigrant to stay
past the expiration of his or her border-crossing card. 8 Unlike a visa,
which authorizes entry to the United States for a specified length of
stay, a border-crossing card allows the holder to cross the border at
will for a certain number of years, typically ten. 9 The third and most
controversial way an undocumented immigrant can enter the
country is through unauthorized entry—i.e., crossing the border
without entering through a checkpoint. 10 Though exact estimates
are difficult, it seems that a little over half of the undocumented
immigrants residing in the United States entered through the latter
method. 11 Needless to say, in addition to this being the most
controversial method of entry, it has also presented the greatest
difficulty in dealing with immigration policy.

A.

Flores and its Effect on Family Separation

Perhaps the greatest controversy in immigration policy has
surrounded the separation of families at the border. 12 This
separation is largely due to a court-enforced settlement known as the
Flores Settlement, 13 which was, ironically, intended to safeguard

8 See 3 of the Most Common Ways People Immigrate Illegally, supra
note 5.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See 3 of the Most Common Ways People Immigrate Illegally, supra
note 5 (“In 2016, the illegal immigrant population in America amounted to
almost 11 million people . . . [e]ach year, an estimated 500,000 people enter
the country illegally, accounting for about 6.5 million of the undocumented
immigrants currently residing in the United States.”); see also Modes of
Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population, supra note 5 (in 2006 it
was estimated that “somewhat more than half [of the illegal immigrant
population in the US] entered the country illegally.”).
12 See Carrie F. Cordero, Heidi L. Feldman, & Chimène I. Keitner, The
Law Against Family Separation, 51 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 432
(2020); see also Stephen Lee, Family Separation as Slow Death, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 2319 (2019).
13 See generally Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, No.
CV
85-4544-RJK(Px)
(C.D.
Cal.
Jan.
17,
1997),
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018.08.15%20PSI%20UA
C%20Report%20Appendix.pdf.
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immigrant children; of course, the results did not match the
intentions of the settlement. 14 An understanding of the history and
effects of the Flores Settlement is essential in dealing with the
ongoing issue of family separation.
While some family separations cannot be avoided, 15 i.e., when
some family members receive deportation orders but others do not,
this is not the primary controversy. 16 The enduring images that
stained the news showed families being separated upon crossing the
border and the poor conditions under which the children of these
families were kept. This produces both a bad outcome and bad
optics for our nation. 17 The far more acceptable approach, we
generally recognize, is that family units apprehended together
entering the country could, and should, be kept together while
asylum or removal proceedings are pending. Unfortunately, the
Flores Settlement makes that legally impossible. 18 Understanding
this perverse outcome requires an examination of the events leading
up to, as well as the contents of, the Flores Settlement.
The controversy began in 1984 when, in response to an influx
of unaccompanied minor-aged children crossing the southern
border, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) declared
that these unaccompanied minors could only be released to a “parent
or lawful guardian” in order to best protect the wellbeing of the
children. 19 This rule became the focal point of Jenny Flores’s
eponymous class action suit brought by immigration activists in

14 Sarah Herman Peck & Ben Harrington, The “Flores Settlement” and
Alien Families Apprehended at the U.S. Border: Frequently Asked
Questions, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 9 (upd. 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45297.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
15 Steinbuch, supra note 3.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18Matthew Sussis, History of The Flores Settlement, CENTER FOR
IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Feb. 11, 2019), https://cis.org/Report/HistoryFlores-Settlement (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
19 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 6.
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1985. 20 The petitioners argued for the release of the detained minors
to other “responsible adults” when their “parent or legal guardian
fails to personally appear to take custody of them” and for better
conditions in border detention facilities where the children awaited
their judicial proceedings if there was no suitable adult to receive
them. 21 The suit came before the Supreme Court of the United
States in 1993 after a nearly decade-long battle. 22 The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the District Court to the Central District

See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 296 (1993). See also Peck &
Harrington, supra note 14, at 6. Jenny Flores was the daughter of an illegal
immigrant. The mother could not pick up Jenny herself because she feared
her own deportation. Matthew Sussis, History of The Flores Settlement,
FOR
IMMIGRATION
STUDIES
(Feb.
11,
2019),
CENTER
https://cis.org/Report/History-Flores-Settlement (citing The History Of The
Flores Settlement And Its Effects On Immigration, NPR (June 22, 2018)).
Instead, the family wanted cousins to pick up Jenny. Id. INS would not
allow release to the cousins because they were not Jenny’s legal guardians.
Id. The mother’s employer was a Hollywood actor and notified an
immigration attorney on behalf of Jenny. Id.
21 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 6; Flores, 507 U.S. at 296.
22 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 6-7. When the suit was first
litigated in district court, the court granted INS summary judgment on many
of the plaintiffs’ claims. Flores, 507 U.S. at 296. However, it granted the
plaintiffs summary judgment on their equal protection claim since INS
allowed minors in exclusion proceedings to be released to any relative or
friend while requiring minors in deportation proceedings to be released only
to a parent or guardian. Id. Following the district court finding, INS
instituted a national policy allowing minors in both exclusion and
deportation proceedings to be released to a parent, legal guardian, or other
family member. Id. at 296-98. Flores continued with litigation even under
this new rule. Id at 298. Only a week after the rule was in effect, the district
court ruled in favor of Flores, vaguely citing due process concerns, and
issued an order that largely invalidated the new regulation. Id. 298-99. The
Court of Appeals three judge panel reversed the district court’s decision,
but that holding was short lived. Id. at 299. The Ninth Circuit voted to
rehear the case, and an eleven-judge panel “affirmed the District Court
Order in all respects.” Id.
20
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of California, where the parties stipulated to the “Flores
Settlement.” 23
The Flores Settlement laid out the national policy for the
detention and release of unaccompanied minors in custody at
border-detention facilities, scrapping any existing INS policy
inconsistent with the Settlement. 24 Addressing confinement
conditions, the Settlement detailed amenities and accommodations
that the government must provide to minors, while also establishing
guidelines for respectful treatment of minors, including protocols to
protect minors’ dignity. 25 The INS was required to move newly
apprehended minors from the initial holding facility to a licensed
care facility within three days if they were apprehended “in an INS
district in which a licensed program is located,” and five days if they
were not. 26 The time limit on placement could be extended in times

23 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 7. The parties expressed
concern about the length and cost of moving forward with litigation, and
the parties stated they both felt the settlement was in the best interest of
justice. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 13, at 1-2.
24 Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 13, at 1-3; Peck &
Harrington, supra note 14, at 7.
25 “Facilities will provide access to toilets and sinks, drinking water
and food as appropriate, medical assistance if the minor is in need of
emergency services, adequate temperature control and ventilation, adequate
supervision to protect minors from others, and contact with family members
who were arrested with the minor.” Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra
note 13, at 4. In addition to maintaining the minor’s dignity, INS was also
required to be respectful of that minor’s particular vulnerabilities. Stipulated
Settlement Agreement, Id. at 4, 18.
26 Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 13, at 4-5. The
settlement defined “licensed care facility” as “any program, agency or
organization that is licensed by an appropriate State agency to provide
residential, group, or foster care services for dependent children, including
a program operating group homes, foster homes, or facilities for special
needs minors.” Id. at 2.

10
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of an influx of unaccompanied minors, so long as the transfer
occurred as “expeditiously as possible.” 27
Importantly, if the minors were not a danger to themselves or
others, and there was no danger of them not showing up to their
immigration hearing, they had to be released to a family member,
legal guardian, or individual designated by the family,
notwithstanding that the adult family members with whom they
entered the country might still be subject to detention. 28 If the
minors were a danger or a flight risk, then they stayed in one of the
previously mentioned licensed-care programs until their
proceedings were finished or until they were no longer a danger or
a flight risk. 29 The INS had legal custody of all minors in INS
facilities. 30
The theme of the Flores Settlement is that minor-aged children
should be “in the least restrictive setting appropriate for the minor’s
age and special needs.” 31 The overarching idea was that children
were to be reunited with their families, and if that was not
achievable, they were to be treated with the utmost humane care
while awaiting a hearing. 32
The parties to the Flores Settlement intended the settlement to
be temporary, binding only until legislation was passed to

27 Id. at 5. (“[I]n the event of an emergency or influx of minors into the
United States, in which case the INS shall place all minors pursuant to
Paragraph 19 as expeditiously as possible…”). The settlement defines an
influx as “those circumstances where the INS has, at any given time, more
than 130 minors eligible for placement in a licensed program under
Paragraph 19, including those who have been so placed or are awaiting such
placement.” Id.; Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 7 (summarizing the
circumstances warranting an exception).
28 Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 13, at 6.
29 Id. at 7.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 18.
32 See Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 7.
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implement it. 33 Until that time, the district court was charged with
overseeing that the Settlement was carried out. 34 Congress did
implement some, but not all, of the Flores Settlement under the
Homeland Security Act (HSA) in 2002 and Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) in 2008. 35 The HSA
abolished the INS and replaced it with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), transferring responsibilities related to the care and
custody of unaccompanied minors from INS to the Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR). 36 The ORR was charged with
collaborating with other agencies to place the child according to his
or her best interest. 37 In 2008, the TVRPA addressed the treatment
of unaccompanied minors and gave ORR further responsibilities
with regards to minors’ placement and treatment. 38 Aligned with
the Flores Settlement, the TVRPA acknowledged that the ORR
must place the minor in the least restrictive setting possible. 39 Also,
pursuant to the Flores Settlement, the TVRPA required that the
minor go with a suitable guardian or, if none is available, to a
specialized facility. 40 However, because these laws did not

33 Originally, the settlement was to terminate either five years after it
was approved or three years after INS came into “substantial compliance,”
whichever was sooner. Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 13, at
14. In 2001, the parties agreed that the settlement would remain in effect
until forty-five days after the government published final regulations
pursuant to the Settlement. Flores v. Sessions, 862 F.3d 863, 869 (9th Cir.
2017). Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 6. (explaining that the
settlement was still in effect and that a district court judge in California
presided over the settlement).
34 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 1.
35 Id. at 5–6; Flores, 862 F.3d at 870–71.
36 See Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 5. Flores, 862 F.3d at 870
(citing 6 U.S.C. §§ 111, 251, 291, then citing 6 U.S.C. § 279(a), (b)(1)(A),
(g)(2)).
37 Flores, 862 F.3d at 870 (citing 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(B)).
38 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 5; Flores, 862 F.3d at 871
(citing first Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d at 904, then citing 8 U.S.C. § 1232
(b)(1)).
39 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 5; Flores, 862 F.3d at 871
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3)).
40 Id.
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implement all aspects of the Flores Settlement, parts of the original
Settlement were still binding to all minor detainees. 41
Beginning in 2014, apprehensions at the southern border
increased, bringing the Flores Settlement back into the spotlight. 42
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Flores
Settlement applied to both accompanied and unaccompanied
minors. 43 This was after the passage of the HSA and TVRPA, which
only addressed unaccompanied minors. 44 Thus, the original Flores
Settlement still governs the handling of accompanied minors while
only parts of the original settlement govern unaccompanied
minors. 45
Because there has been no further legislation or amendment to
the Settlement, there are now only two ways to process a minor
crossing into the United States at the southern border, all depending
on whether the child is accompanied or unaccompanied. 46 Notably,
both processes are a present-day basis for separation at the southern
border when a family unit crosses with minor children.
When a family unit crosses the southern border with a minor
child, that child is considered accompanied for the purpose of

Flores, 862 F.3d at 870-71.
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. Border Patrol Total
Monthly UAC Apprehensions by Sector (FY 2010 - FY 2019), (Jan. 2020)
(showing that apprehensions of unaccompanied minors at the southern
border increased from 38,759 in FY 2013 to 68,541 in FY 2014. The
numbers for FY 2013 were already a part of an upward trend in
unaccompanied minors, but it was FY 2014 where that number skyrocketed.
Though subsequent years have fluctuated widely, as of FY 2019 the
numbers have never gone below those for FY 2013).
43 Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2016). See also Alex
Nowrasteh, DECLINING DEPORTATION AND INCREASING CRIMINAL ALIEN
RELEASES, CATO INSTITUTE (May 19, 2016) (reporting in 2016 that
unaccompanied minors crossing the southern border reached a peak in 2014
making up 14% of the apprehensions that year); Peck & Harrington, supra
note 14, at 14 (citing Lynch when calling 2014 a “migrant crisis”).
44 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 8.
45 Id.
46 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 8. See also Ms. L v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 310 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2018).
41
42
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processing the minor. 47 However, there are three ways for an
accompanied minor to become unaccompanied: (1) if the DHS
cannot determine if the minor and adults are actually related, (2) if
the DHS determines the minor is at risk if he or she stays with the
adult, and (3) if the adult is referred for criminal prosecution. 48 If
any of these three events takes place, the now-unaccompanied minor
must be transferred within seventy-two hours of apprehension to the
HHS pursuant to the TVPRA. 49
Alternatively, if the minor remains accompanied and the family
unit is detained together, the clock begins to tick on when the minor
must transfer to a licensed facility, pursuant to the Flores
Settlement. 50 The Flores Settlement exception allowing for a longer
period before transfer during times of influx is currently in effect,
and the judge presiding over the Settlement has ruled that
approximately twenty days is the maximum amount of time the
minor can remain in an unlicensed facility. 51 Therefore, if the
family proceedings take longer than twenty days, as they commonly
do, the child must be transferred. 52 Families are consequently
separated because there are currently no licensed facilities that can
hold families, preventing the family from being transferred
together. 53
The Flores Settlement does not protect against family
separation. While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 2016
that, by the plain language of the Settlement, it applies to
accompanied minors as well as unaccompanied minors, the court

Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 8.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, MYTH VS. FACT: DHS
ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY (June 18, 2018).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 MYTH VS. FACT, supra note 48; Peck & Harrington, supra note 14,
at 9. See also supra note 26 (describing how the Flores Settlement defines
“licensed care facility.”)
52 MYTH VS. FACT, supra note 48. (noting that the alternative to transfer
is release.)
53 Id. (Noting also that the alternative is to release the entire family);
Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 12–13.
47

48U.S.
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refused to recognize any rights for accompanied minors’ parents
implied in the Settlement. 54 Even though the Flores Settlement
makes release to a parent the first choice for a minor, juveniles who
were detained with their parents can be released without their
parents. 55 In the court’s words, “the fact that the Settlement grants
[minors] a right to preferential release to a parent over others does
not mean that the government must also make a parent available; it
simply means that, if available, a parent is the first choice.” 56 Thus,
the ruling that the Flores Settlement applies to accompanied minors
did nothing to mitigate family separation.

B. FLORES TODAY
On April 6, 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions
announced that the United States would be invoking a “zero
tolerance policy”:
I have put in place a “zero tolerance” policy for illegal entry
on our Southwest border. If you cross this border
unlawfully, then we will prosecute you. It’s that simple. If
you smuggle illegal aliens across our border, then we will
prosecute you. If you are smuggling a child, then we will
prosecute you and that child will be separated from you as
required by law. If you make false statements to an
immigration officer or file a fraudulent asylum claim,
that’s a felony. If you help others to do so, that’s a felony,
too. You’re going to jail. So if you’re going to come to
this country, come here legally. Don’t come here
illegally. 57
Because the policy called for immediate prosecution, any
family unit with minor children crossing the border illegally was
separated within seventy-two hours pursuant to the TVPRA,
because the minor was considered unaccompanied as soon as the

Lynch, 828 F.3d at 905–08 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 908-09.
56 Id. at 908.
57 Press Release 18-417, Department of Justice Office of Public
Affairs, Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal
Illegal Entry, (Apr. 6, 2018); Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 11.
54
55
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parents were prosecuted. 58 Further, if the family crossed legally
claiming, for example, asylum, and the family still had to await
judicial proceedings regarding their claim, when the waiting period
exceeded twenty days, families either had to be separated or the
family released in its entirety. 59
The massive family separation caused such intense political
uproar that on June 20, 2018, President Donald Trump signed an
Executive Order (EO) requiring family units to stay together during
prosecution proceedings to the “extent permitted by law.” 60 To
avoid family separation or the alternative of releasing the entire
family, on June 21, 2018, the Trump administration filed an
Application for Relief from the Flores Settlement. 61 However, the
Ninth Circuit held the EO did not go far enough, and on June 26,
2018, in Ms. L v. ICE, the judge granted an injunction that required
families to stay together and all separated families be reunited. 62
Further, the court did not allow the administration to hold the minor
children together with their families for the entirety of the
prosecutorial proceedings because that would not comply with the
Flores Settlement. 63 On July 9, 2018, the application for relief was
denied. 64

C. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The Obama administration previously sought to mitigate family
separation for family units already in the country by only removing
immigrants convicted of a violent crime when it replaced Secure
Communities (S-COMM) with the Priority Enforcement Program

58

48.

Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 12; MYTH VS. FACT, supra note

MYTH VS. FACT, supra note 58.
Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 11; Ms. L. v. ICE, 310 F. Supp.
3d 1140, 1140 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
61 Id. at 13.
62 Peck & Harrington, supra note 14, at 10; Ms. L, 310 F. Supp. 3d at
1149.
63 Id. at 10.
64 Id. at 13.
59
60
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(PEP). 65 When establishing the prioritization program, Jeh Johnson,
then-DHS Secretary, explained that the program affected
immigration policy across the board, including the discretion used
to decide whether and how to apprehend, detain, and remove illegal
aliens. 66 Johnson explained that the policy should apply not only to
the decision to issue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Appear, but
also to a broad range of other discretionary enforcement decisions,
including deciding: (i) who to stop, question, and arrest; (ii) who to
detain or release; (iii) whether to settle, dismiss, appeal, or join in a
motion on a case; and (iv) whether to grant deferred action, parole,
or a stay of removal instead of pursuing removal in a case. 67
Johnson went on to describe the three levels of the prioritization
program. 68 The policy mandated the non-enforcement of certain

The primary goal of S-COMM was “to identify and process all
criminal aliens amendable for removal while in federal, state and local
custody.” Jessica Vaughn, Public Safety Impact of Obama Administration’s
Priority Enforcement Program, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Mar.
31, 2016), https://cis.org/Public-Safety-Impact-Obama-AdministrationsPriority-Enforcement-Program (quoting U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, “1st Quarterly Status Report (Apr.-June 2008) for Secure
Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal
Aliens” (Aug. 2008). However, the Secretary summed up the transition to
PEP by stating, “unless the alien poses a demonstrable risk to national
security, enforcement actions through the new program will only be taken
against aliens who are convicted of specifically enumerated crimes.” Jeh
Johnson, Memorandum for Secure Communities, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secur
e_communities.pdf.
66 Jeh Johnson, Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal
of Undocumented Immigrants, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_pros
ecutorial_discretion.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 3-4.
Priority 1 illegal aliens were:
(a) aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage, or
who otherwise pose a danger to national security;
65
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(b) aliens apprehended at the border or ports of entry while
attempting to unlawfully enter the United States;
(c) aliens convicted of an offense for which an element was
active participation in a criminal street gang, as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 52 l(a), or aliens not younger than 16 years of age who
intentionally participated in an organized criminal gang to further
the illegal activity of the gang;
(d) aliens convicted of an offense classified as a felony in the
convicting jurisdiction, other than a state or local offense for
which an essential element was the alien's immigration status; and
(e) aliens convicted of an “aggravated felony,” as that term is
defined in section 101(a)(43) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act at the time of the conviction.
Priority Number 2 illegal aliens were:
(a) aliens convicted of three or more misdemeanor offenses,
other than minor traffic offenses or state or local offenses for
which an essential element was the alien’s immigration status,
provided the offenses arise out of three separate incidents;
(b) aliens convicted of a “significant misdemeanor,” which for
these purposes is an offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse
or exploitation; burglary; un[]lawful possession or use of a
firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or driving under the
influence; or if not an offense listed above, one for which the
individual was sentenced to time in custody of 90 days or more
(the sentence must involve time to be served in custody, and does
not include a suspended sentence);
(c) aliens apprehended anywhere in the United States after
unlawfully entering or re-entering the United States and who
cannot establish to the satisfaction of an immigration officer that
they have been physically present in the United States
continuously since January 1, 2014; and
(d) aliens who, in the judgment of an ICE Field Office Director,
USCIS District Director, or USCIS Service Center Director, have
significantly abused the visa or visa waiver programs.
Priority 3 illegal aliens:
Priority 3 aliens are those who have been issued a final order of
removal on or after January 1, 20 14. Aliens described in this
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aspects of the country’s immigration laws. Some critics of SCOMM felt that the PEP did not go far enough. 69
Under both S-COMM and the PEP, enforcement started at the
state or local level. When an individual was arrested and
fingerprinted during intake, those fingerprints could be matched
against an immigration database and alert U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) to the illegal alien’s custody. 70 One
major difference between the two programs is how drastically the
PEP narrowed the population of immigrants that could be detained

priority, who are not also described in Priority 1 or 2, represent
the third and lowest priority for apprehension and removal.
Resources should be dedicated accordingly to aliens in this
priority. Priority 3 aliens should generally be removed unless they
qualify for asylum or another form of relief under our laws or,
unless, in the judgment of an immigration officer, the alien is not
a threat to the integrity of the immigration system or there are
factors suggesting the alien should not be an enforcement priority.
These critics argue that PEP was not a “new” policy but rather a
“rebrand[ing]” of S-COMM.
Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the
“Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L. REV. 594, 601 (2016). The main
critiques of S-COMM were the immigrants being targeted by the program
and the way these people were being rounded up. Id. at 621. Essentially,
critics of S-COMM did not like that seemingly minor offenders were being
deported instead of and alongside more serious offenders, despite the fact
that both parties were in the country illegally and therefore criminals. See
id. at 622. In turn, these critics felt PEP did not affect enough meaningful
change and that there would still be too large a number of immigrants
deported. Id. at 23. These critics’ second critique of S-COMM was that they
disagreed with the required information sharing between local law
enforcement and ICE. Id. Consequently, critics of PEP felt that this issue
was not sufficiently addressed by the new policy, and in turn actually began
efforts to warn immigrants of possible attempts to be captured by ICE. Id.
at 626.
70 See Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Dec. 4, 2021);
Immigration Detainers Under the Priority Enforcement Program,
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(Jan.
25,
2017),
AMERICAN
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigrationdetainers-under-priority-enforcement-program.
69
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for removal proceedings. 71 Under S-COMM, ICE could request a
detainer against a person who was, first, charged with an offense by
a state or local law enforcement agency and, second, the
immigration officer had reason to believe was subject to ICE
removal proceedings. 72 Thus, an immigrant with no criminal
history other than his or her entrance into the country could be
detained for removal proceedings. 73 By contrast, under the PEP, an
individual must first be convicted of an offense. 74 Whether or not
that individual will be subject to removal proceedings after his or
her conviction depends on the ranking of the convicted offense on
the PEP priority list, whether the offense pertained to gang activity,
and if the individual is a threat to national security. 75
The presence of minors in a situation can skew proceedings
under the PEP. Logically, minors, particularly young children, are
less likely than adults to be a high priority. For example, one of the
Priority 1 categories specifically did not apply to any individual
under the age of sixteen. 76 Another category, “aliens convicted of

Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Dec. 4, 2021); Jessica
Vaughn, Concerns About the New Priority Enforcement Program, CTR. FOR
IMMIGR. STUD. (Aug. 6, 2019), https://cis.org/Vaughan/Concerns-AboutNew-Priority-Enforcement-Program (last visited Dec. 4, 2021);
Immigration Detainers Under the Priority Enforcement Program, AM.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(Jan.
25,
2019),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigrationdetainers-under-priority-enforcement-program (last visited Dec. 4, 2021);
Priority Enforcement Program—How DHS is Focusing on Deporting
Felons, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 30, 2019); Vaughn, Public Safety
Impact, supra note 65.
72 Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
73 See id.
74 Id. See also Vaughn, Public Safety Impact, supra note 65 (describing
an example of how the conviction requirement can lead to the release of
even prioritized immigrants).
75 Johnson, supra note 66, at 2.
76 Id. at 3 (“aliens not younger than 16 years of age who intentionally
participated in an organized criminal gang to further the illegal activity of
the gang”).
71
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an offense classified as a felony in the convicting jurisdiction,” will
often exclude juveniles by virtue of states’ juvenile delinquency
laws, which may not define any offenses as felonies unless the
perpetrator is an adult. 77 Once in the United States, minors affect
other removal proceeding decisions, in which DHS personnel are
directed to consider family in the United States and young children
as factors in deciding removal. 78
Notably, the only time convicted individuals were subject to
removal proceedings solely based on their status is when they were
apprehended at the border, not in the United States interior. 79 This
policy under the PEP established that “ICE will no longer seek
transfer of individuals with civil immigration offenses alone.” 80
Limiting the categories of immigrants subject to removal was
not the only way the program changed the practice. The PEP also
limited how and whether ICE could get custody, even if it was
considered a priority. 81 Part of the cited reason for implementing
the PEP was because certain cities and jurisdictions did not agree

77 Johnson, supra note 66, at 3. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27303(15) (defining a “delinquent juvenile” to include “A juvenile ten (10)
years old or older who: Has committed an act . . . that, if the act had been
committed by an adult, would subject the adult to prosecution for a felony”)
(emphasis added). The juvenile may be tried as an adult if the juvenile is at
least sixteen and charged with a felony, or for certain specified offenses
when the juvenile is fourteen or fifteen. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b–c).
78 Johnson, supra note 66, at 6.
79 See id. at 3. “[A]liens apprehended at the border or ports of entry
while attempting to unlawfully enter the United States…”
80 Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T,
https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
81 See id.; see also Vaughn, Public Safety Impact, supra note 65;
Vaughn, Concerns About the New Priority Enforcement Program, supra
note 71; see also Immigration Detainers Under the Priority Enforcement
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
(Jan.
25,
2019),
Program,
AM.
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigrationdetainers-under-priority-enforcement-program (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
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with the work of ICE and were refusing to comply. 82 The Obama
administration felt the PEP would relieve these tensions. 83 The PEP
expressly acknowledges that transfer to ICE is contingent on local
cooperation, stating:
Nothing in this memorandum shall prevent ICE from seeking
the transfer of an alien from a state or local law enforcement agency
when ICE has otherwise determined that the alien is a priority under
the November 20, 2014 Policies for the Apprehension, Detention
and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum and the
state or locality agrees to cooperate with such transfer. 84
Further, under S-COMM, ICE could request the individual be
detained in custody at the initial booking, allowing no chance for the
alien to avoid ICE. 85 However, under the PEP, ICE could not act
until an individual was convicted. 86 This could lead, albeit rarely,
to an individual who is convicted of a priority offense but sentenced
to time already served, being released before ICE arrived. 87 Also of
note, under S-COMM, ICE issued a request to detain; however,

82 Priority Enforcement Program—How DHS is Focusing on
Deporting Felons, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 30, 2019),
https://cis.org/Public-Safety-Impact-Obama-Administrations-PriorityEnforcement-Program (last visited Dec. 4, 2021). See e.g. Cházaro, supra
note 69, at 627 (discussing the Trust Act and how it limited local law
enforcement cooperation with ICE under S-COMM).
83 See Priority Enforcement Program—How DHS is Focusing on
Deporting Felons, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 30, 2019).
84 Jeh Johnson, Memorandum for Secure Communities, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND
SEC.
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secur
e_communities.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2021). See also Vaughn, Public
Safety Impact, supra note 65 (quoting Jeh Johnson, Memorandum for
Secure Communities, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 20, 2014)
(highlighting how this allows sanctuary cities to continue noncompliance).
85 See Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS
ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
86 See Vaughn, Concerns About the New Priority Enforcement
Program, supra note 71.
87 Id.
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under the PEP, the request was for notification by law enforcement
when the individual was to be released. 88
The service-of-detainer requirement was another way the local
enforcement agency interacted with ICE regarding removals under
PEP. 89 S-COMM encouraged, but did not require, that local law
enforcement serve the individual with a copy of the detainer notice
in order for it to be effective; under PEP, however, if the individual
was not served with the request, ICE could not carry it out, rendering
the request void. 90 It was local law enforcement’s responsibility to
serve the notice before ICE could intercede. 91
Additionally, the PEP narrowed the 48-hour holding
limitation. 92 Under a detainer request issued under either S-COMM
or the PEP, an individual could only be held for 48 hours beyond the
time served under the law enforcement agency. 93 The PEP,
however, included Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in the 48-hour
period, whereas S-COMM had excluded them from the
calculation. 94

88 Jeh Johnson, Memorandum re Secure Communities 2, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Nov. 20, 2014); see also 8 C.F.R. 287.7(d) (“Upon a
determination by the Department to issue a detainer for an alien not
otherwise detained by a criminal justice agency, such agency shall maintain
custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody
by the Department.”). The decision to replace detention requests with
notification requests was designed, at least in part, to address constitutional
issues with detention requests that were not based on probable cause. See
Johnson, supra, at 2, fn.1 (collecting cases holding that detention requests
without probably cause violated the Fourth Amendment).
89 See Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS
ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Dec. 4, 2021) (breaking down
the new procedural obstacles that LEA now had to follow under PEP).
90 Id.
91 Id. (“Detainer form requires that [the arresting local Law
Enforcement Agency] provide a copy to the individual subject to the
detainer in order for the request to be effective.”) (emphasis in original).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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The PEP led to some increase in the number of individuals
released despite being eligible for removal. 95 It has been reported
that “[t]wo-thirds of those releases were legally required rather than
the result of ICE’s use of discretion.” 96 The Washington Post also
reported this effect, citing DHS officials. 97
One argument in favor of the relaxed enforcement, however,
that was not terribly persuasive is that immigrants commit fewer
crimes than citizens. 98 First, this claim is difficult to substantiate
because immigrant crime studies fail to distinguish immigration
status. 99 Only one state records the immigration status of those
convicted or in their local prisons, and the State Criminal Alien
Assistance Program, a means to collect federal data on immigrants
in state and local prisons, cannot accurately report on incarceration
numbers because it is incomparable to any other measure of data. 100
Moreover, this is not the relevant metric. Such a comparison
would only matter if we were analyzing which group to allow into
the country. But, of course, that is not the debate, as there is no
claim that immigrants would somehow displace legal residents in

95 Alex Nowrasteh, Declining Deportations and Increasing Criminal
Alien Releases—The Lawless Immigration Policies of the Obama
INSTITUTE,
(May
19,
2016),
Administration,
CATO
https://www.cato.org/publications/testimony/declining-deportationsincreasing-criminal-alien-releases-lawless-immigration (last visited Dec. 4,
2021).
96 Id.
97 Jason Markon, Obama Administration Scales Back Deportations in
WASHINGTON
POST
(July
2,
2015)
Policy
Shift,
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dhs-scales-back-deportationsaims-to-integrate-illegal-immigrants-into-society/2015/07/02/890960d21b56-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html?utm_term=.45aaa03bb59e
(last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
98 Alex Nowrasteh, Illegal Immigrants and Crime—Assessing the
Evidence,
THE
CATO
INSTITUTE
(Mar.
4,
2019),
https://www.cato.org/blog/illegal-immigrants-crime-assessingevidence?queryID=286cdaf689fbbce058f3a3bb25fd99cd (last visited Dec.
4, 2021).
99 Id.
100 Id.
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the overall level of crime in the United States. Even if immigrants
helped reduce the overall crime rate, they would undoubtedly
increase the absolute quantity of crime, given the increase in
population.

D. ASYLUM CLAIMS
The question of whether releasing entire family units into the
country pending the outcome of asylum claims requires a look at the
likelihood of success of those petitions, because a low likelihood
increases the chances that unqualified individuals will remain in
country after crossing the border. Looking specifically at those who
were apprehended after unauthorized entry and made an asylum
claim based on credible fear (i.e., fear of persecution or torture
should they be returned to their home country), twelve percent of
such individuals were granted asylum in the fiscal year 2019. 101
This is very close to the long-running average; from the fiscal year
2008 to the fiscal year 2019, 14% of such claims were granted. 102
For that same period, 55% of credible-fear claimants were either
immediately found to have no credible fear or failed to apply for
asylum after making a credible-fear claim. 103 Out of those with a
credible-fear claim who actually apply for asylum, more than two
thirds are denied. 104 Furthermore, statistics from U.S. immigration
courts indicate that over half of U.S. immigration judges have an
asylum denial rate of 70% or higher, and one-in five have an asylum

101

(2019).

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,

Credible Fear and Asylum, FY 19 Q4,

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CREDIBLE FEAR AND ASYLUM PROCESS: FISCAL YEAR
(FY) 2008 – FY 2019, (2019).
103 Id.
104 Id. (This document looks at a representative group of one hundred
credible fear claimants to better demonstrate the relevant percentages. Out
of those one hundred original claimants, thirty-one had a credible fear claim
and applied for asylum but were denied. Dividing that number by the total
number of claimants with a credible fear claim who then applied for asylum,
forty-five, and accounting for significant figures, shows that sixty-nine
percent of asylum claims made by applicants with a valid credible fear claim
are denied).
102
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denial rate of over 80%. 105 This is despite the fact that the total
number of asylum claims began to climb precipitously in 2015. 106
The annual number of total claims stayed around 40,000 from 2008
to 2014, but reached 63,744 in 2015 and went all the way up to
213,320 in 2019. 107 Asylum denial rates have gone up in similar
proportion since 2015. 108
Of course, only half of the equation is the likelihood of success
on asylum claims. The other half is the probability that the asylum
seekers show up for their post-entry hearings. To the extent that
they do not, these individuals both violate the law and skirt the
immigration and asylum processes. Almost half of those with
pending asylum cases do not appear for trial, choosing instead to
stay in the country illegally. 109

III. THE COSTS OF IMMIGRATION
An honest analysis of immigration must account for costs as
well as benefits. Such a complicated issue clearly cannot be all good
or all bad, as some on each side of the debate seem to suggest. The
costs can be broadly divided into economic costs and social costs.

A. ECONOMIC COSTS
Much debate has been made about whether immigration
provides a net positive or net negative effect on national wealth. Of

Asylum Success Varies Widely Among Immigration Judges, TRAC
IMMIGRATION
(Dec.
9,
2021),
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/670/#:~:text=Based%20on%20TR
AC's%20updated%20data,of%20less%20than%2010%20percent
(last
visited Mar. 13, 2022).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Salvador Rizzo, How Many Migrants Show Up for Immigration
Court Hearings? THE WASHINGTON POST, (June 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/26/how-manymigrants-show-up-immigration-court-hearings/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
105
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course, the United States has often pursued policies that have
significant economic costs. So, to be clear, a net negative cost is not
dispositive on any immigration policy. However, the facts need to
be understood in order to fairly evaluate this important metric.

1. Tax Contributions
Immigrants clearly provide economic value and tax revenue to
the communities in which they live. 110 While this is true, such
claims suggest that immigrants generate substantial tax revenue,
which is likely untrue. 111 Because these immigrants typically only
make modest incomes, estimates generally conclude that these
immigrants have a relatively small financial impact on overall tax
revenues. 112 Also, one must take into consideration those who work
off-the-books and thereby evade paying taxes all together. 113
The immigrant working class typically secures low-skilled jobs,
often jobs that are hard to fill with the available domestic

110 Steinbuch, 3 Common Arguments for Overlooking Illegal
Immigration, supra note 3.
111 See id. See Matthew O’Brien, Spencer Raley, & Jack Marin, The
Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United States Taxpayers,
FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM 1-2 (2017),
https://www.fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/Fiscal-Burden-ofIllegal-Immigration-2017.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2021). (pointing out
common flaws in the various reports that show illegal immigrants actually
contribute taxes to their communities. These flaws include, but are not
limited to, the fact that these studies oftentimes narrowly define what an
undocumented immigrant is, these studies fail to examine what the tax
revenue would be if an American employee held the same job, and these
studies fail to analyze tax refunds.).
112 See Cong. Budget Office, The Impact of Unauthorized Immigrants
on the Budgets of State and Local Governments 1, 3 (CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, 2007) https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress2007-2008/reports/12-6-immigration.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
113 See Jon Feere, The Myth of the “Otherwise Law-Abiding” Illegal
Alien, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, 11 (Oct. 7, 2013)
https://cis.org/Report/Myth-Otherwise-LawAbiding-Illegal-Alien
(“Approximately seven to eight million illegal aliens are holding jobs, and
approximately 45 to 50 percent of them are estimated to be working off the
books.”).
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workforce. 114 These occupations pay low wages, and some of these
workers and their children receive government assistance. 115 Like
United States citizens who make only modest incomes, many

114 See Steven A. Camarota, Enforcing Immigration Law is Cost
Effective, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Oct. 28, 2018),
https://cis.org/Camarota/Enforcing-Immigration-Law-Cost-Effective; see
Steven A. Camarota, Deportation vs. The Cost of Letting Illegal Immigrants
Stay, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://cis.org/Report/Deportation-vs-Cost-Letting-Illegal-ImmigrantsStay; See O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 27, 57 (explaining
how only very few illegal aliens are able to secure high skilled work)
(reporting that there were approximately 12.5 million illegal aliens in the
US and approximately 4.2 million citizen children of illegal aliens who were
born in the United States).
115 See Camarota, Deportation vs. The Cost, supra note 103 (citing
Jason Richwine & Robert Rector, The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants
and Amnesty to the US Taxpayer, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 6,
2013),
https://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-fiscal-costunlawful-immigrants-and-amnesty-the-us-taxpayer (last visited Dec. 4,
2021)); See Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants in the United States, CENTER
IMMIGRATION
STUDIES
(Aug.
2012)
FOR
https://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2012/immigrants-in-the-unitedstates-2012.pdf; See Jeffery S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of
Unauthorized Immigrants in the Unites States, PEW HISPANIC CENTER (Apr.
14,
2009),
https://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/14/a-portrait-ofunauthorized-immigrants-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021)
(reporting an estimate of 49% of illegal aliens have not completed high
school, 28% only have a high school education, 11% have some college,
and 3% have a college degree and reporting on the fiscal drain of illegal
immigrants, excluding their children, based on education level); see
O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 27, 57 (citing Richwine &
Rector, supra; Passel & Cohn, supra; Steven A. Camarota, Welfare Use by
Legal and Illegal Immigrant Households, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION
STUDIES (Sept. 2015), http://cis.org/Welfare-Use-Legal-Illegal-ImmigrantHouseholds (last visited Dec. 4, 2021) (reporting the average illegal alien
household makes $36,000 and explaining how illegal aliens only bring in
modest wages from low skilled work and how adding in children increases
the fiscal burden). See also Jason Richwine, The Cost of Welfare Use by
Immigrant and Native Households, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES
(May. 9, 2016) https://cis.org/Report/Cost-Welfare-Use-Immigrant-andNative-Households (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
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immigrants do not pay federal income taxes; moreover, those using
valid identification may qualify for tax refunds through programs
such as the Additional Child Tax Credit or an Earned Income Tax
Credit. 116 By one estimate, the government pays immigrants, as a
group, more money back in federal income tax refunds than they
pay in. 117 State income taxes are subject to the same variables as
federal income tax. It is noteworthy that, unlike with federal taxes,
the immigrant work force likely pays more in state income tax than
it receives back in state tax refunds, 118 however this net contribution
in state income tax likely does not exceed the deficit created in
federal income taxes. 119
Income taxes, of course, are not the only taxes to which
immigrant workers are subject. 120 Working on-the-books will

116 See O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 27-31 (stating that
an Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) is a “lump sum paid by the U.S
Treasury to low income workers with children.”). See id. at 29. (stating that
illegal aliens not using a fraudulent Social Security number are able to file
for these credits with an Individual Tax Identification Number (ITIN), a tax
processing number given out to foreign nationals regardless of their
immigration status.) See id. (“The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is
refundable tax credit available to low- and moderate- income individuals
who are employed.” See id. (stating that the average income of an illegal
immigrant household coupled with children would likely meet the
requirements of an EITC.) See id. at 30. (arguing that illegal aliens are
supposed to be blocked from receiving these credits.) See id. (stating that
doesn’t seem to be stopping illegal aliens because they are either using
fraudulent SSN or the IRS erroneously issued ITIN holders an EITC.) See
id. (citing Without Expanded Error Correction Authority, Billions of
Dollars in Identified Potentially Erroneous Earned Income Credit Claims
Will Continue to Go Unaddressed Each Year, U.S. TREASURY INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORT NO. 2016-40-036, (2016)).
117 See O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 31 (reporting an
illegal alien federal income tax deficit of $3,541,600,000).
118 See id. at 52.
119 See id. at 31, 52. (stating that FAIR reports a $3,541,600,000 federal
tax deficit and a $1,050,000,000 net state tax revenue. Notably, the latter
number excludes EITCs.).
120 See id. at 31–33, 52–54.
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subject workers to Social Security and Medicare taxes. 121 Further,
whether working on-the-books or off, all immigrant workers are
subject to various federal excise taxes, as well as state property,
sales, and gas taxes. 122 Factoring in these various other taxes that
immigrant workers pay increases their tax contribution to society. 123
However, then considering the amount of government assistance
and use of public facilities (such as roads for which gas taxes are
generally collected) immigrant workers as a group benefit from
suggests that their tax contribution is likely surpassed by
expenditures to create a deficit. 124 Specifically, the largest state and
local expenditure on services provide to immigrants is education,
more than twice what is spent on the next highest: Medicaid

121 See id. at 31 (stating that FAIR estimates that illegal aliens, matched
by their employers, contribute $18,490,000,000 through Social Security and
Medicare Taxes).
122 See id. at 32 (stating that the excise taxes include taxes on fuel,
tobacco, alcohol and airline tickets). See id. at 52–53 (stating that the excise
taxes estimated for illegal aliens totaled $401,140,000. FAIR estimates that
illegal aliens pay $918,000,000 in property taxes, $598,600,000 in fuel
taxes and $1 billion dollars in sales tax).
123 See generally id. at 55. See also, Camarota, Deportation vs. The
Cost, supra note 103 (citing THE ECONOMIC AND FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF
IMMIGRATION 289, Francine D. Blau and Christopher Mackie, eds., 2016)
(reporting an estimated lifetime net fiscal drain of illegal immigrants,
excluding their children, at $65.3 billion per million illegal immigrants. A
subsequent study by the CIS adjusted the previous report to allow for
inflation in 2018.) See also Camarota Enforcing Immigration Law, supra
note 114 (reporting a $69.6 billion net fiscal drain per every million illegal
immigrants).
124 See O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 57. See also
Camarota, Deportation vs. The Cost, supra note 114 (reporting on the
difference between taxes paid by illegal immigrants and the services they
enjoy); See also Camarota, Enforcing Immigration Law, supra note 103
(offering updated figures on the difference between the taxes immigrants
pay and the services they enjoy). See generally Richwine, The Cost of
Welfare, supra note 106 (reporting on the volume of welfare that
immigrants consume).
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benefits. 125 In addition, per capita the cost of policing and judicial
proceedings contributes to the balance sheet. 126

2. Education Costs
Education rings up a hefty bill both in federal and state
budgets. 127 It is the largest expenditure in state and local
spending. 128 It is also the largest category of cost related to
immigration at the state and local level. 129 Since Plyler v. Doe, legal
precedent has mandated that public schools accept immigrant
students. 130 As of 2007, an estimated five million of the 53.3 million
school-age children in the United States were either unauthorized
immigrants or the children of unauthorized immigrants. 131
Localities throughout the country have felt the impact on their
education systems. In 2014, several counties in northern Virginia
received resettled unaccompanied minors, including 1,131 children
in Fairfax County, 417 in Prince William County, and 227 in

125 See Cong. Budget Office, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 3, 11
(CONG.
BUDGET
OFFICE,
2007)
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-20072008/reports/12-6-immigration.pdf.
126 See id. at 14–18 (stating that judicial costs include federal
incarceration, The Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations,
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), other ICE agencies and operations, State
Criminal Alien Assistance Program, Executive Office for Immigration
Review, costs associated with unaccompanied minor children’s care, and
Byrne Grants.) See id. at 44 (stating that states bordering migrant countries
allocate some of their security budgets to border security). See also supra,
Part I.
127 See O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 8–24, 37–48.
128 See Cong. Budget Office, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 7
(CONG.
BUDGET
OFFICE,
2007)
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-20072008/reports/12-6-immigration.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
129 See O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 37-39.
130 O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 37; Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982).
131 CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 112, at 7-8.
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Loudon County. 132 Concerned about the additional cost of
educating the influx of new students and the burden on local tax
payers, several county officials and school board members joined in
asking the federal government to reimburse the cost. 133 While exact
numbers on the cost of education were not available, one county
supervisor estimated that Fairfax County would spend over $14
million to educate the new unaccompanied minors over the course
of a full school year. 134
In secondary education, immigrants cannot receive
government-funded financial aid for college; however, several states
have passed laws that help ease that burden and make college
education possible. 135 For example, seven states have begun
offering scholarships to immigrants. 136 Eighteen states allow
undocumented students to get in-state tuition. 137

3. Medicaid and Other Welfare Costs
While immigrants generally are not formally eligible for most
federal or state healthcare, they nonetheless often receive medical
care and their children often do qualify for government-assisted
healthcare. 138 For example, immigrants can receive government-

Julie Zauzmer & Moriah Balingit, Counties Look at Cost of
Educating Unaccompanied Minors Who Crossed Border, THE
WASHINGTON
POST
Post
(Oct.
9,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/counties-look-at-costof-educating-unaccompanied-minors-who-crossedborder/2014/10/09/1f883fdc-4e6c-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2021); Caitlin Gibson, Loudoun to Gather Information
on Undocumented Child Immigrants, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 3,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/loudoun-to-gatherinformation-on-undocumented-child-immigrants/2014/10/03/599dbd564989-11e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
133 Zauzmer & Balingit, supra note 132.
134 Id.
135 O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111 at 38.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 10–13, 40–41.
132
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funded healthcare through uncompensated hospital expenditures,
Medicaid-financed births, and improper Medicaid payments. 139
As with healthcare, immigrants are not eligible for certain
welfare programs such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), although again their U.S.-citizen children can be
eligible. 140 However, when U.S.-born children of immigrants
receive government assistance it is reasonable to consider these
payments as a related cost of immigration since there would have
been no expenditure of U.S. funds if not for the parent’s
immigration. 141
Immigrants are directly eligible for some benefits such as
Women Infants and Children (WIC). 142 Among the benefits that
U.S.-born citizens can receive while living with their illegalimmigrant parents are SNAP, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 143
Likewise, immigrants do not qualify for federal public housing; their
presence in a household does not bar receipt of such benefits, but
rather causes the government to distribute them in a prorated
fashion. 144 However, at least one state, Massachusetts, does allow
immigrants access to state and local housing assistance. 145 The

Id. at 10-12. Uncompensated medical care is when an uninsured
individual receives medical care that they do not pay for, see id. at 10.
Medicaid births are . . . what their name suggests: a birth funded by
Medicaid, see id. at 11. Improper Medicaid payments include improper
payouts to illegal immigrants or Medicaid fraud, see id. at 12.
140 Id. at 21.
141 See id. at 20.
142 Id. at 21.
143 Id. at 21–23. SNAP is best known as food stamps. Id. at 21. TANF
temporarily provides “cash assistance to supplement their earned income;”
illegal aliens can receive TANF funds if the child that they are supporting
is a U.S. citizen. Id at 22-23. SSI provides support to U.S. citizens with
mental or physical disabilities. Id. at 23.
144 Id. at 23 (citing MAGGIE MCCARTY & ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RL31753, IMMIGRATION: NON-CITIZEN ELIGIBILITY FOR NEEDSBASED HOUSING PROGRAMS (2008)).
145
Eligibility,
MASSLEGALHELP,
https://www.masslegalhelp.org/housing/eligibility (last visited Dec. 4,
2021).
139
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exact amount of housing assistance that is actually spent as a result
of immigration is difficult to calculate, however, due to a lack of
hard data on the phenomenon. 146

B. SOCIAL COSTS
Another important consideration are the social costs associated
with the violations of law that accompany immigration under the
current immigration system. 147 Having a system wherein (a) large
numbers of immigrants have no choice but to violate law and (b)
large expenses are incurred in the criminal justice system because of
those violations is not tenable long term. It is important to account
for and reduce these social costs.

1. Driver Licenses
There are a number of federal and state statutes that immigrants
confront. 148 One concern that state governments have tried to

See O’Brien, Raley, & Marin, supra note 111, at 23-24.
See Steinbuch, supra note 3; see also Feere, supra note 113.
148 Feere, supra note 113, at 4-7 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1325):
“An alien violates 8 U.S.C. § 1325 if he or she: (1) enters or attempts
to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by
immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by
immigration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United
States by a willfully false or misleading representation or the willful
concealment of a material fact.”
See id. at 4 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)) (“An alien is deportable under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) and (C)(i) if the alien’s visa status has changed,
or the alien has failed to maintain ‘nonimmigrant’ status”). See also Feere,
supra note 113, at 5-6 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253):
“An alien violates 8 U.S.C. § 1253 when he or she:
(A) willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States within a
period of 90 days from the date of the final order of removal under
administrative processes, or if judicial review is had, then from the date of
the final order of the court,
146
147
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address is driver safety among immigrant populations, specifically
with driver license regulations.
Immigrants, particularly
undocumented immigrants, will often inevitably violate
documentation laws, such as driving without a valid driver’s
license. 149 In response to this problem, fifteen states and D.C. have
enacted “Green Light” laws, which require county clerks to issue
driver licenses to certain immigrants under specific
circumstances. 150 Advocates have suggested that these laws
promote road safety; 151 since immigrants are driving anyway, the

(B) willfully fails or refuses to make timely application in good faith
for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's departure,
(C) connives or conspires, or takes any other action, designed to
prevent or hamper or with the purpose of preventing or hampering the
alien's departure pursuant to such, or
(D) willfully fails or refuses to present himself or herself for removal
at the time and place required by the Attorney General pursuant to such
order.”
See also Feere, supra note 113, at 6.
149 Id. at 7. Other additional offenses include 8 U.S.C. § 1302: all
aliens, including illegal aliens, have to register their presence in the U.S.
within thirty days. Id at 4. Aliens are also likely to be driving without
insurance or driving without valid vehicle registration. Id. at 7.
150 States Offering Driver’s Licenses to Immigrants, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
(Feb.
6,
2020)
https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/states-offering-driver-slicenses-to-immigrants.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2021) (“These states—
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Utah, Vermont and
Washington—issue a license if an applicant provides certain
documentation, such as a foreign birth certificate, foreign passport, or
consular card and evidence of current residency in the state.”).
151 See e.g. Chaiyaporn Baokaew, Licenses For Undocumented
Immigrants Would Make Roads Safer, Lawmakers Say, WGBH NEWS, (Jan.
23, 2019), https://www.wgbh.org/news/local-news/2019/01/23/licensesfor-undocumented-immigrants-would-make-roads-safer-lawmakers-say
(last visited Dec. 4, 2021); see also Mary Duan, Should States Give Driver’s
Licenses to Unauthorized Residents?, INSIGHTS BY STANFORD BUSINESS,
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licensing process will ensure they know how to operate their
vehicles safely. 152 While the policy may produce some positive
results, the claims have suggested positive benefits that are greater
than those likely to occur.
First, the idea that driver licenses are safety devices rather than
a government revenue-driving tool is at least somewhat dubious. 153
More importantly, the belief that immigrants, or anyone for that
matter, will drive regardless of legal access to licenses would also
imply that those failing the exam will simply drive without licenses
as well. Thus, the premise that underlies Green Light laws—that
licensing does not affect willingness to drive—is problematic
because it leads to the conclusion that immigrants will drive
regardless of whether or not they obtain driver licenses. 154 If true,
the availability of driver licenses to immigrants will have no effect
on their willingness to drive and thus no effect on safety. 155

(Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/should-states-givedrivers-licenses-unauthorized-residents (last visited Dec. 4, 2021); see also
Chris Burrel, Licensed Undocumented Immigrants May Lead To Safer
Roads, Connecticut Finds, NPR, (7:04 A.M. ET, May 24, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/05/24/719959760/licensed-undocumentedimmigrants-may-lead-to-safer-roads-connecticut-finds (last visited Dec. 4
2021).
152 Baokaew, supra note 151.
153 Contra id. (Stating that driver’s licenses ensure motorists have the
necessary eyesight and skills to drive).
154 Duan, supra note 151. (showing that once California granted
licenses to illegal aliens, the overall number of accidents in the state did not
change despite there being 600,000 more licensed drivers from when the
law became effective in 2015 to the time of the study).
155 But see id. (While this study found that California’s law granting
licenses to illegal immigrants did not have an impact on the overall number
of accidents, it did show a ten percent reduction in hit and run incidents.
The researchers attributed this to a licensed illegal immigrant’s decreased
propensity to flee the scene of an accident before police arrive).
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In reality, at least some of those without licenses will not
drive. 156 The idea that legal prohibitions do not at least partially
affect behavior is belied by an economic analysis of law. 157 If
licensure didn’t affect outcomes, then we would not limit licenses to
those who are of-age or suspend licenses of drunk drivers. 158
Indeed, to assert the alternative—that immigrants will drive
regardless of whether they have licenses—suggests an insidious bias
against, or a benign contempt for, those would-be beneficiaries who
allegedly are willing, en masse, to violate laws beyond those relating
to immigration status. 159
As for hard statistical support either for or against increased
safety from Green Light licenses, there does not seem to be any
comprehensive survey on the topic, though there are some simple
trend lines. 160 For example, four years after Connecticut enacted its
Green Light legislation, supporters pointed to a decrease in the
number of hit and runs statewide as evidence that the measures were
increasing safety. 161 A particular article in NPR focused on the four

See Katie Rooney, Revoking Licenses Deters Drunk Driving, TIME,
(July
25,
2007),
http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1646906,00.html (last
visited Dec. 4, 2021).
157 Jacob Bogage, Yes, Stricter Driving Laws Really Do Make Us Safer,
WASHINGTON
POST,
(July
14,
2016,
6:00
a.m.),
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/07/14/yes-stricterdriving-laws-really-do-make-us-safer/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
(discussing how driving laws with strict penalties demonstrably reduce
whatever the targeted activity is of particular interest is the effect of
restricting access to driver’s licenses for teens. There we see that restricting
a particular demographics’ access to driver’s licenses reduces their use of a
vehicle overall.)
158 See id.; see Rooney, supra note 156.
159 President George W. Bush, Speech to NAACP’s 91st Annual
Convention (July 10, 2000) (speaking about the dangers of “the soft bigotry
of low expectations” in the context of academic achievement. Proponents
of Green Light laws demonstrate a similar “soft bigotry,” implying that
unlawful immigrants are the type of people who will always ignore laws
prohibiting unlicensed driving).
160 Burrel, supra note 151.
161 Id.
156
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cities that issued the most Green Light licenses in that time frame:
Bridgeport, Norwalk, Danbury, and Stamford. 162 Of those four,
Bridgeport and Stamford both saw a decrease in the number of hit
and runs from 2016 to 2018, while Norwalk and Danbury saw an
increase. 163 Supporters of the law touted this, alongside a nine
percent statewide drop in hit and runs, as evidence of the law’s
effectiveness. 164 Indeed, it was positive news; however, it was for
this data only.
However, when we expand the data set from 2016-2018 to
2016-2020 (to exclude any changes caused by reduced travel from
COVID-19 shutdowns), 165 Bridgeport, Danbury, and Stamford
show a slight downward trend in the number of hit-and-runs while
Norwalk has a slight upward trend. 166 Furthermore, this data leaves
out 2015 statistics, even though Connecticut’s Green Light-style
regulations were enacted on January 2, 2015. If the data set begins
in 2015, we see that Bridgeport and Norwalk show an upward trend
while Stamford and Danbury show a downward trend. 167

162

Id.
Id.
164 Id. (“[Connecticut Transportation Safety Research Center Crash
Data Liaison Charles] Grasso said undocumented immigrant drivers are
confident they won't be charged with unlicensed driving and are less likely
to flee a crash.”).
165 COVID-19: Governor Lamont's Executive Orders for the State of
&
GOODWIN,
Connecticut,
SHIPMAN
https://www.shipmangoodwin.com/covid-19-governor-lamonts-executiveorders-for-the-state-of-connecticut.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
166 See infra Figure 1.
167 See infra Figure 2.
163
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Figure 1

Figure 2

Neither of these data sets conclusively determine the effect of
Green Light laws on safety as measured by the number of hit-andruns.
Answering that question would require crafting a
comprehensive statistical model that considers all other factors that
could affect the number of hit-and-runs. This would be beyond the
scope of this article. However, it would be a compelling case for
further study, especially since Connecticut crash data is so easily
accessible to the general public. 168 Without further research into
drivers-safety statistics and the measurable effects of driving safety

See
CONNECTICUT
CRASH
DATA
https://www.ctcrash.uconn.edu/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
168
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regulations, we do not know if these laws provide the social benefit
the advocates of these laws claim they do.

2. Employment-Related Law
The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) made
it illegal for employers to hire undocumented immigrants. 169 Under
the IRCA, employers are subject to penalties for hiring
undocumented immigrants, and enough routine violations can land
an employer in prison. 170 There is, however, a legal defense if the
employer made a good faith effort to comply with the law, meaning
that the employer truly did not know that the immigrant’s legal
status. 171 To work in the United States, one must have a Social
Security number. 172 Accordingly, the employer’s good faith effort
requires that the employer examine various forms of identification
that purport to confirm the immigration status that the immigrant is
claiming. 173 If an employer is blameless, then the immigrant must
have lied about citizenship or immigration status and presented the
employer with falsified documents, including a Social Security
number. 174 This happens often: the Office of the Chief Actuary

Feere, supra note 113, at 7; Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986, Pub.L. 99–603, Nov. 6, 1986.
170 Id. at 7-8; See also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
171 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3).
172SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 05-10107, Foreign Workers and Social
Security Numbers (2017), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10107.pdf (last
visited Dec. 4, 2021); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. NO. 05-10096, Social
Security Numbers for Noncitizens (2018), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN05-10096.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2021).
173 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). An employer must verify an employee’s
authorization status with either (1) a US passport, resident alien card, alien
registration card, or other document issued by the Attorney General or (2) a
combination a SSN or authorized employment document and a driver’s
license or similar document. Id. Option (1) still requires the alien get a
SSN. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 172. “While you wait for your Social
Security number, your employer can use a letter from us stating you applied
for a number, and your immigration documents can prove your
authorization to work in the United States.” Id.
174 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 172.
169
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estimated that in 2010, approximately 700,000 unauthorized
immigrants had Social Security numbers obtained using fraudulent
birth certificates, and an additional 1.8 million were working under
Social Security numbers that did not match their names. 175 Even if
an immigrant did not claim citizenship but rather claimed that he or
she was legally permitted to work in the United States, a Social
Security number is still required, and a failure to produce a Social
Security number should put the employer on alert. 176 As a result, if
an undocumented immigrant is working in the United States, unless
the employer is also breaking the law, the immigrant must be
working under a fake or stolen Social Security number. 177
Further, a working undocumented immigrant has no option but
to prevaricate when filling out the required I-9 form that mandates
the employee verify which legal citizenship or immigrant status
defines the employee. 178 An undocumented immigrant has no
truthful choice on the form, meaning that when the undocumented
immigrant fills the form out, he or she has made a false statement or
fraudulent act on a government form. 179 An immigrant who gives a
false Social Security number subjects himself or herself to 42 U.S.C.
§ 408, penalties for committing Social Security fraud, and

Stephen Goss et al., Soc. Sec. Admin., Office of the Chief Actuary,
Effects of Unauthorized immigration on the Actuarial Status of the Social
Security
Trust
Funds
(Apr.
2013),
available
at
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_notes/note151.pdf (last visited Dec.
4, 2021).
176 Feere, supra note 113, at 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3).
177 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 172.
178 Feere, supra note 113, at 8-9. The available options for the alien to
choose on the I-9 form are, a citizen of the US, a noncitizen nation of the
US, a lawful permanent resident, or an alien authorized to work. Id. (citing
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Employment Eligibility
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.,
Verification
Form
I-9,
DEP'T
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-9-paperversion.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2021)).
179 Id. (first citing 18 U.S.C § 1001) (then citing U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Employment Eligibility Verification Form I-9, DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC.). The available options for the alien to choose on the I9 form are, a citizen of the US, a noncitizen nation of the US, a lawful
permanent resident, or an alien authorized to work. Id.
175
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potentially 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, aggravated identify theft if the
forged Social Security number belongs to another individual. 180
Additionally, in presenting immigration documents to either the
Social Security Administration or the employer to secure a job, the
undocumented immigrant has violated 18 U.S.C. § 1546, fraud and
misuse of visas, permits, and other documents, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c)
penalties for document fraud, or both. 181 Depending on the types of
falsified documents the undocumented immigrant presents or
possesses, they could violate numerous other documentation
offenses. 182 If at any time the undocumented immigrant presents
himself or herself as a United States citizen, they have committed a
felony. 183
If the employer hires the undocumented immigrant off-thebook, this does not somehow remove the employee from violating
work-related offenses. If the undocumented immigrant has been in
the United States for 183 days, the government considers the
undocumented immigrant a resident alien and is therefore required
to pay taxes like a U.S. citizen. 184 If the undocumented immigrant
is working off-the-books and therefore not paying taxes, the
undocumented immigrant violates 26 U.S.C. § 7203 by willfully
failing to file a return, supply information, or pay taxes. 185

180 Id.; See also 42 U.S.C. § 408 (describing various ways to
improperly and deceptively obtain or possess a social security card); 18
U.S.C. § 1028A.
181See Feere, supra note 113, at 9-10; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1546; 8
U.S.C. § 1324c.
182 Feere, supra note 113, at 12-13 (describing several additional laws
that an alien breaks if the alien expands on his “legal” façade with various
other falsities such as falsified citizenship documents).
183 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 911).
184 Id., at 11 (first citing Introduction to Residency Under U.S. Tax
Law,
I.R.S.,
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/internationaltaxpayers/introduction-to-residency-under-us-tax-law, then citing Taxation
of
U.
S.
Resident
Aliens,
I.R.S.,
https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/taxation-ofresident-aliens).
185 Id., at 11-12; 26 U.S.C. § 7203.
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Having a system wherein (a) large numbers of immigrants have
no choice but to violate the law and (b) large expenses are incurred
in the criminal justice system because of the above-described legal
issues is not tenable long term. These social costs must be accounted
for.

IV. CONCLUSION
Understandably, immigration law is often an emotional topic,
but unfortunately, debates about it too often quickly lead to hostility,
notwithstanding that the United States’ immigration policy
represents one of the highest moral ideals that the citizens and
government of this country can embody. Two of the most
intractable questions that we have confronted in the contemporary
immigration debate is understanding (1) how and why we wound up
where we are regarding family separation and the treatment of
unaccompanied minors, and (2) how to measure monetary and social
costs of immigration fairly. This article has presented an objective
look at these two critical issues with the hope that the analysis will
allow for a better evaluation of the complicated immigration
questions we collectively face.
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